L8: Cipher Techniques: Problems

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Acknowledgement

- Many slides are from or are revised from the slides of the author of the textbook
  - Matt Bishop, Introduction to Computer Security, Addison-Wesley Professional, October, 2004, ISBN-13: 978-0-321-24774-5. Introduction to Computer Security @ VSU's Safari Book Online subscription
  - http://nob.cs.ucdavis.edu/book/book-intro/slides/

Outline

- Precomputing possible messages
- Misordered blocks
- Statistical regularities

Use Ciphers: A Challenge

- Cryptographic systems are sensitive to the environment they are being used
- Using cryptographic systems over a network introduces problems
- Using a good cipher is not enough, how to use the cipher matters greatly

- What can go wrong if we naively use ciphers?

Threats in Network Environment

- Knowledge of the environment and threats in the environment
  - Is the set of possible messages small?
  - Do the messages exhibit regularizes that remain after encipherment
  - Can an active wiretapper rearrange or change parts of the message?
- Three common problems
  - Precomputation, misordered blocks, and statistical regularities

Attack 1. Precomputation

- Precomputing possible messages or *forward searches*

- Set of possible messages *M* small
- Public key cipher *f* used
- Idea: precompute set of possible ciphertexts *f(M)* and build table *(m, f(m))* where $m \in M$
- When ciphertext *f(m)* appears, use table to find *m*

Forward Search Attack: Example

- Eve knows Alice will send Bob one of two messages using a Public Key Cryptosystem
  - Enciphered BUY or enciphered SELL
- Using public key e_{Bob}, Eve precomputes a table
  - $c_1 = f(m_1) = \{BUY\}_{e_{Bob}}$
  - $c_2 = f(m_2) = \{SELL\}_{e_{Bob}}$
- Looking up intercepted enciphered message, Cathy sees Alice send Bob m_2.
- Eve knows Alice send SELL

Obscure Threats

- Example: digitized sound (Simmons, 1982)
  - Initial calculations suggest 2^{32} such plaintexts
  - Seems like far too many possible plaintexts
  - Analysis of redundancy in human speech reduced this to about 100,000 ($\approx 2^{17}$)
  - This is small enough to worry about precomputation attacks

Notes on Precomputation

- Chosen plaintext attack against symmetric crytosystems
  - Derive key
  - e.g., Hellman, 1980
- Precomputation attack against public key crytosystems
  - Drive plaintext messages
  - Does not reveal private key

Misordered Blocks

- Parts of a ciphertext message can be deleted, replayed or reordered (Denning, 1982)

Misordered Blocks: Example

- Alice sends Bob message
  - $n_{Bob} = 77$, $e_{Bob} = 17$, $d_{Bob} = 53$
  - Message is LIVE (11 08 21 04)
  - Enciphered message is 44 57 21 16
- Eve intercepts it, rearranges blocks
  - Now enciphered message is 16 21 57 44
- Bob gets enciphered message, deciphers it
  - He sees EVIL

Notes on Misordered Blocks

- Digitally signing each block will not stop this attack
  - The parts are not bound to one another
- Two approaches to counter the attack
  1. Generate a cryptographic checksum of the *entire* message and sign it
  2. Place sequence numbers in each block of message, so recipient can tell intended order. Then you sign each block

Statistical Regularities

- If plaintext repeats, ciphertext may too

Statistical Regularities: Example

- Example using DES:
  - input (in hex):

    `3231 3433 3635 3837 3231 3433 3635 3837`
  - corresponding output (in hex):

    `ef7c 4bb2 b4ce 6f3b ef7c 4bb2 b4ce 6f3b`

Notes on Statistical Regularities

- Code book mode (CBM)
  - Each part is enciphered separately, so the same plaintext always produces the same ciphertext
  - Each part is effectively looked up in a list of plaintext-ciphertext pairs
  - It is the cause of the statistical regularity
- Approach to counter the attack
  - Cascade blocks together (chaining, more details later)

What These Mean

- Use of *strong* cryptosystems, *well-chosen* (or random) keys *not enough* to be secure
- Other factors:
  - Protocols directing use of cryptosystems
  - Ancillary information added by protocols
  - Implementation (not discussed here)
  - Maintenance and operation (not discussed here)

Summary

- Discussed three attacks
  - Precomputation (forward search)
  - Misordered blocks
  - Statistical regularities
- Strong cryptosystems and random keys not enough
- Careful engineering matters