# L16: Ring-based Access Control

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### Acknowledgement

- Many slides are from or are revised from the slides of the author of the textbook
  - Matt Bishop, Introduction to Computer Security, Addison-Wesley Professional, October, 2004, ISBN-13: 978-0-321-24774-5. <u>Introduction to Computer Security @ VSU's</u> <u>Safari Book Online subscription</u>
  - http://nob.cs.ucdavis.edu/book/book-intro/slides/

### Outline

- □ Locks and keys
- □ Rings-based access control
- □ Propagated access control lists

### Locks and Keys

- Associate information (*lock*) with object, information (*key*) with subject
  - Latter controls what the subject can access and how
  - Subject presents key; if it corresponds to any of the locks on the object, access granted
- □ Can be dynamic
  - ACLs, Capability-Lists are static and must be manually changed
  - Locks and keys can change based on system constraints, other factors (not necessarily manual)

# **Cryptographic Implementation**

- □ Enciphering key is lock; deciphering key is key
  - Encipher object o; store  $E_k(o)$
  - Use subject's key k' to compute  $D_k(E_k(o))$
  - Any of *n* can access *o*: store

$$o' = (E_1(o), ..., E_n(o))$$

Requires consent of all n to access o: store

$$o' = (E_1(E_2(...(E_n(o))...)))$$

### Example: IBM 370

- □ IBM 370: process gets access key; pages get storage key and fetch bit
  - Fetch bit clear: read access only
  - Fetch bit set, access key 0: process can write to (any) page
  - Fetch bit set, access key matches storage key: process can write to page
  - Fetch bit set, access key non-zero and does not match storage key: no access allowed

### **Example: Cisco Router**

### Dynamic access control lists

```
access-list 100 permit tcp any host 10.1.1.1 eq telnet
access-list 100 dynamic test timeout 180 permit ip any host \
    10.1.2.3 time-range my-time
time-range my-time
    periodic weekdays 9:00 to 17:00
line vty 0 2
    login local
    autocommand access-enable host timeout 10
```

#### □ Limits external access to 10.1.2.3 to 9AM–5PM

- Adds temporary entry for connecting host once user supplies name, password to router
- Connections good for 180 minutes
  - Drops access control entry after that

# **Type Checking**

### □ Lock is type, key is operation

- Example: UNIX system call *write* can't work on directory object but does work on file
- Example: split I&D space of PDP-11
- Example: countering buffer overflow attacks on the stack by putting stack on non-executable pages/segments
  - □ Then code uploaded to buffer won't execute
  - Does not stop other forms of this attack, though ...

### **More Examples**


#### □ LOCK system:

- Compiler produces "data"
- Trusted process must change this type to "executable" becore program can be executed

#### □ Sidewinder firewall

- Subjects assigned domain, objects assigned type
  - Example: ingress packets get one type, egress packets another
- All actions controlled by type, so ingress packets cannot masquerade as egress packets (and vice versa)

# **Ring-Based Access Control**



Process (segment) accesses another segment

Read

Execute

□ *Gate* is an entry point for calling segment

**D** Rights:

*r* read; *w* write; *a* append; *e* execute

# **Reading/Writing/Appending**

- $\square Procedure executing in ring r$
- □ Data segment with *access bracket*  $(a_1, a_2)$
- □ Mandatory access rule
  - $r \le a_1$  allow access
  - $a_1 < r \le a_2$  allow *r* access; not *w*, *a* access
  - $a_2 < r$  deny all access

# Executing

- $\square$  Procedure executing in ring *r*
- $\square$  Call procedure in segment with *access bracket* ( $a_1$ ,  $a_2$ ) and call bracket ( $a_2, a_3$ )
  - Often written  $(a_1, a_2, a_3)$
- □ Mandatory access rule
  - $r < a_1$ allow access; ring-crossing fault

  - $a_3 < r$
  - $a_1 \le r \le a_2$  allow access; no ring-crossing fault  $a_2 < r \le a_3$  allow access if through valid gate deny all access

### Versions

### □ Multics

- 8 rings (from 0 to 7)
- □ Digital Equipment's VAX
  - 4 levels of privilege: user, monitor, executive, kernel

### □ Older systems

2 levels of privilege: user, supervisor

# **Propagated Access Control List**

### □ PACLs

- Implements ORGON
- □ Creator kept with PACL, copies
  - Only owner can change PACL
  - Subject reads object: object's PACL associated with subject
  - Subject writes object: subject's PACL associated with object
- Notation: PACL<sub>s</sub> means s created object; PACL(e) is PACL associated with entity e

### **Multiple Creators**

- Betty reads Ann's file *dates*   $PACL(Betty) = PACL_{Betty} \cap PACL($ *dates*) $= PACL_{Betty} \cap PACL_{Ann}$
- □ Betty creates file *dc*

 $PACL(dc) = PACL_{Betty} \cap PACL_{Ann}$ 

- PACL<sub>Betty</sub> allows Char to access objects, but PACL<sub>Ann</sub> does not; both allow June to access objects
  - June can read *dc*
  - Char cannot read *dc*

### Exercise L16-1

□ Question 7 of Exercise 14.8 in the textbook (page 259)

### Summary

- Access control mechanisms provide controls for users accessing files
- Many different forms
  - ACLs, capabilities, locks and keys
    - **Type checking too**
  - Ring-based mechanisms (Mandatory)
  - PACLs (ORCON)